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On Construction of Natural Numbers in Genetic 
Phenomenology (2)
The Origins of Naturalistic Learning
MUTO Shinji
Introduction1
 This paper continues from “On Construction of Natural Numbers in Genetic Phenomenology (1).” In the 
previous paper, I addressed the questions “what are numbers, how are they constituted, and how are they perceived?” 
by examining their generative phenomenological constitutive processes.2 To do so, I identified the operation of time-
consciousness as a significant function in the noesis (conscious act) of “counting,” and the passive synthesis that 
constitutes the noema (content) of counting. From there I considered the operation of time-consciousness, in 
particular, futural intention and how this relates to the expanding futural horizon, and how this initially enables the 
mathematical inductive reasoning used as proof of the succession of natural numbers.
 However, after the previous paper there remained a question that I must address. That question is: How are the 
numbers “1” and “0,” which form the foundation of mathematics, phenomenologically constituted? These numbers 
are essential to the system of mathematics: 1, which is the beginning of the natural numbers; and 0, which exists 
separately from the natural numbers. How do they become phenomenological objects? In addition, other questions 
remain: If we suppose that the axiomatic mathematical reasoning to define continuous natural numbers enables on a 
basic level the futural intentional conscious constitution, then how does the mind theorize the distinction between 
unlimited infinity with that sense of “countability” and the infinite real numbers (real infinity) contained in the set of 
cardinal numbers?
 I would like to continue resolving these remaining questions, but several important points should first be 
considered. There is the question of how the mind acquires a conceptual number as an object, which is different to 
the question of how it perceives numbers. In other words, this is the question of the intuition of essences, an 
important methodology of phenomenology. I would like to examine this point here.
 In this paper, I will examine the following issues. First, I will summarize the arguments on passive synthesis that 
were brought together and considered in the previous paper. I will then examine the essential instinctive process of 
conceptualizing the numbers as mental objects. I will evaluate the objectification of the numbers 1 and 0 as 
considered from their completed or uncompleted state of intentionality. I will not attempt a phenomenological 
explanation of infinity as unlimitedness or real infinity here. However, the discussions about the process of the 
intuition of essences identified in this paper will form important preparation for this, pointing toward the possibility 
of demonstrating “the process by which the numbers 1 and 0 originate.” Accordingly, another useful explanation may 
come from thinking of the naturalistic conceptual premises of “numbers” being prepared as tools, which are the 
fundamental origin of the world in which we live. If this is so, one could justifiably press for fundamental changes to 
our generally accepted ideas regarding natural sciences and assert the importance of reconsidering science and 
technology.
Articles
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1.  From the Collective Combination of Passive Synthesis to the Intuition of Essences
 Husserl studied whether the general ideas of sets and cardinal numbers were the true object of mathematical 
enquiry and how these objects are constituted in the consciousness. Husserl stated in Philosophy of Arithmetic 
(abbreviated below to PoA) that this configuration is created by the mental operation of “collective combination” 
(vgl. XVII, S. 90f). In the previous paper, I summarized this enquiry into a collective combination to emphasize that 
when the consciousness constitutes the individual objects comprising a set, these are also all constituted together as a 
set. As a result, I confirmed that this constitution is established by means of the implicit operations of passive, innate 
time consciousness, and at the same time, previously constituted passive syntheses are generated as noema-like 
things by the combination of collected items.3 Aside from this, I also considered that mathematical induction, which 
is one of Peano’s important axioms for defining natural numbers, is related to futural intention and futural horizon, 
which first enables the awareness of continuity.4 On the other hand, because collective combination was constituted 
in primitive settings of consciousness, one can argue that it led to the active action of “counting” ordinally, and 
formed the foundation for mathematically-prescribed pluralities of abstract and conceptual cardinal numbers. 
Therefore, in mathematics, the notion that collected items as cardinal numbers are more fundamental than ordinal 
numbers may not just come from the logical explanation of real numbers’ continuity (cardinality), but may also be 
considered as the very reason for the essential constitutive operation of consciousness.
 Phenomenological analysis such as this clearly demonstrates that active, higher-order theoretical constitution by 
the self (logical reasoning such as induction and proof) and conceptual objects such as mathematics or logic are 
supported by the operation of passive synthesis and time-consciousness in the structure of consciousness. However, 
in the previous paper, I did not explain how one can establish the status of numbers as conceptual objects. As Husserl 
advises in Ideen 1, the essence and concept of “number” has a different status as a conceptual object to the mental 
representation of numbers that emerges in the consciousness (vgl. HuaIII, §22). Based on Husserl’s advice, I must 
clarify the conscious work of perceiving a number as an object on the conceptual level. The next thing that must be 
reviewed is the intuition of essences, which is the action of perceiving a concept. I will consider the facts of this 
intuition of essences, which will pave the way for the following discussion by revealing the process of instinctively 
conceptualizing numbers.
2.  The Process of Intuition of Essences
a) On the Intuition of Essences
 Famously, Husserl drew a distinction between different essential characteristics of scholarship: “experiential 
science,” which is based on the likely laws of causality at the root of experience (vgl. HuaIII, §2); and “eidetic 
science,” which intuits the essence of experiential science’s many objects of study and uncovers the relationships that 
must exist between them (vgl. HuaIII, §7). Naturally, mathematics and logic belong to the latter (ebd.)5. However, 
how are essences and concepts afforded by consciousness? These are generally understood to be universal, but how 
does such a pure, formal essence separated from experience relate to the object that is constituted in intentional 
experience? For example, suppose that essences and concepts are grasped in a general and universal sense through 
the abstraction of experience. However, if experience creates the opportunity to grasp essences, the reality and 
contingency of that experience must be contained within that essence, and by that point, essences and concepts are 
no more than a possibility at best and cannot be understood as having a priori qualities of idea and form. Therefore, 
how should we understand the status of the so-called “making iron from wood” of intuiting essence from constituted 
experience?
 To answer the questions above requires a review of Husserl’s analysis of the intuition of essences. In Experience 
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and Judgement, Husserl described a process leading to the intuition of essences at three levels: “1. The productive 
activity, which consists in running through the multiplicity of variations. 2. The unitary linking in continuous 
coincidence. 3. The active identification, which brings out the congruent over against the differences” 
(“herauszuschauende,” EU, S. 419). Furthermore, in Ideen 1 Husserl described general essence as “taken purely as 
the moment that can be singled out intuitively (herauszuschauende) in the individual tone (alone or else by 
comparing one tone with others as ‘something common’)” (HuaIII, S. 13).
 In other words, the process by which consciousness arrives at the intuition of essences involves 1. encountering 
many individual objects; 2. comparing those objects; 3. establishing points of commonality; and 4. intuiting those 
points of commonality. However, the starting point of the process of acquiring an intuition of essences is the 
constitution of an experiential object, and as such, even if the objects are compared and points of commonality are 
drawn out (abstracted), it will be impossible to avoid questions such as those described above. Therefore, a way of 
intercepting realities and contingencies is needed to arrive at the intuition of essences. Regarding this, I will highlight 
the “course” by which one moves from 1. to 2. and then from 2. to 3. In the next section, I will consider the 
characteristics of this course of movement using the three-stage process described in Experience and Judgement.
b) From the Constitution of Individual Objects to Comparison and Contrast: On Free Variation
 First, I will consider the shift from 1. “the constitution of individual objects” to 2. “comparison.” As Husserl 
stated, obtaining and comparing various individual objects involves the first of the three levels: “produce the 
multiplicity of variations.” Husserl described this as “based on the modification of an experienced or imagined 
objectivity, turning it into an arbitrary example which, at the same time, receives the character of a guiding ‘model’, 
a point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants. It is based, therefore, on a 
variation.” (EU, S. 410f). In other words, one considers a certain experiential object as an example, and on this basis, 
one varies it in the imagination; that is, one carries out a multiplicity of arbitrary variations. Husserl thought that 
imaginary objects were liberated from any contingent nature unrelated to “factual actuality” (EU, S. 423) or “any 
factual existent” (EU, S. 425) due to this arbitrary variation of examples (vgl. EU, §89). Thus, why would this 
arbitrariness and imaginary multiplicity of variations pave the way from the starting point of an empirical, factual 
object toward a formal essence?
 The first point to address here is the operation of the “imagination.” Husserl described this as “[A] complex of 
imaginings never comes to an end that does not leave open the possibility of a free development (Ausgestaltung) in 
the sense of a new determination” (EU, S. 202f).6 In other words, the work of the imagination makes examples into 
“possible things” by freely creating variations by opening up possibilities. The second point is the “arbitrariness” of 
the imagined variations. Husserl described this as a “remarkable and truly important consciousness of ‘and so on, at 
my pleasure’ [that] belongs essentially to every multiplicity of variations. Only in this way is given what we call an 
‘infinitely open’ multiplicity…” (EU, S. 413). In other words, from the work of the imagination described in the first 
point, one produces a multiplicity of variations of examples, freely open to possibilities. From there according to the 
arbitrariness described in the second point, one produces a great number of things, just as free to be however one 
might imagine them. In doing so, differences and similarities in content arise amid the numerous multiplicities of 
variations that have been produced. These differences and similarities in content enable comparisons. Husserl 
described this as associative synthesis of like with like (das Gleich), based on the first consciousness of the universal 
(vgl. EU, §81). In particular, “Preceding this seeing, there is the transition from the initial example, which gives 
direction and which we have called a model, to ever new images … In this transition from image to image, from the 
similar to the similar, all the arbitrary particulars attain overlapping coincidence in the order of their appearance and 
enter, in a purely passive way, into a synthetic unity … This means that it is passively preconstituted as such and that 
the seeing of the eidos rests in the active intuitive apprehension of what is thus preconstituted…” (EU, S. 413f.). 
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From here, one must take care to state that comparisons are preconstituted to conform to passive synthesis.7 While 
comparing and contrasting according to this kind of association of similarity or affinity and resistance of difference, 
one soon becomes aware of a multiplicity of variations that are “arbitrarily dissimilar.”
 Husserl sounds a note of caution regarding this so-called arbitrarily decreased similarity: “That the eidos 
depends on a freely and arbitrarily producible multiplicity of variants attaining coincidence (Deckung), on an open 
infinity, does not imply that an actual continuation to infinity is required, an actual production of all the variants … 
On the contrary, what matters is that the variation as a process of the formation of variants should itself have a 
structure of arbitrariness, that the process should be accomplished in the consciousness of an arbitrary development 
(Fortbildung) of variants” (EU, S. 412f). As Husserl describes here, the arbitrariness of free variation does not 
require that all possible variants are produced to discover the essence. As above, through the constitutive process one 
can produce many new variants, but it is not possible to produce limitless possible variants within one’s actual 
experience. However, this continuous observation of what is called “arbitrarily decreased similarity” is presumably 
related to the formulated futural horizon by means of the unfulfilled aspirations of futural intention.8 The more one 
repeats this free variation and forms the tendencies of functions and content into a futural horizon, the more these 
become increasingly unrealized and unspecified. However, one becomes absolutely aware of the possibilities, even 
without having perfectly enumerated every last one of them.
 Based on these points, the multiplicity of variations can be understood as the work of the imagination on 
experiential objects, to carry out arbitrary changes toward imagined objects possessing infinitely open “pure 
possibility” (EU, S. 426). Because the object that was first experienced possesses pure possibility within the 
imagination leads to an elimination of factuality and contingency from the individual object used as the starting point 
(for that reason, the process of free variation to reach an intuition of essences may even begin with an imaginary 
object [vgl. HuaIII, §4]).9 Taking this first step opens the door leading toward the essences themselves.
c) From Comparison and Contrast to Establishing Commonalities: Ideation
 Next, I will consider the shift from 2. “comparison” to 3. “establishing commonalities.” Through the first step of 
“producing a multiplicity of variations,” the next one prepares a foothold onto the second stage of “unitary linking in 
continuous coincidence,” or “establishing commonalities.” As described above, the arbitrary, free variation in the 
imagination is separate from experience or factuality and is checked by acquiring infinite new, similar images one 
after another. However, if while imagining a multiplicity of variations such as a multiplicity of shapes of cat or colors 
of dog, one ends up with variations no longer overlapping, or that overlap at a different point, thus eliminating their 
similarity. This is how one comes to discover a sort of commonality. Husserl pointed out that “It then becomes 
evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that in such free variations of an original 
image, e.g. of a thing, an invariant is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, without which an object 
such as this thing, as an example of its kind, would not be thinkable at all” (EU, S. 411). In other words, the more 
free variations on some sort of original image or example are accumulated. Thus, a limit will be reached no matter 
how they develop, and when that happens, the immutable item will conversely surface as some content unrelated to 
that point of difference pushing a variation past the limit of similarity.10 Accordingly, commonalities that become 
prominent this way may be considered a result of the convergence toward the limit of variation, or rather toward the 
immutable item among the multiplicity of imaginations. Husserl thought that this immutable item was itself the 
“general essence”: the form or idea.
 This is certainly related to the operation of time-consciousness. Husserl described this as “the presupposition … 
that the multiplicity as such is present to consciousness as a plurality and never slips completely from our grasp. 
Otherwise, we do not attain the eidos as the ideally identical…” (EU, S. 414). When successively carrying out the 
free variation of imaginatively fabricating arbitrary new forms from examples, subsequently produced things cannot 
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overlap if these variables do not meet the condition of “not letting go,” or maintain a grasp in the consciousness. To 
conform to this need to overlap, one has to keep track of the previous objects. Consequently, Husserl insisted that 
“only if we retain in grasp the things imagined earlier, as a multiplicity in an open process, and only if we look 
toward the congruent and the purely identical, do we attain the eidos” (ebd.).
 As described above, the unitary linking in continuous coincidence in the second step, together with the operation 
of time-consciousness, identifies commonalities between products of the variations in the first step, and these 
commonalities are considered equivalent to a formally unified general essence. Accordingly, the infinitely expanding 
possibilities of the first step converge upon a single necessary essence as an unchangeable commonality or 
congruence; that is, an idea or a form by means of time-consciousness and the unified synthesis of similarities. 
Husserl stated that “one may call this conceiving or even conceptualizing mental activities that are full of this kind of 
formal variation (diese vielgestaltige Geistestätigkeit)” (HauIX, S. 76). In other words, the process of expansion and 
convergence of variables through free variation could certainly be described as an ideation of examples.
d) From Establishing Commonalities to Recognizing Formal Objectivity: On Identification
 Furthermore, Husserl stated that “In this multiplicity (or, rather, on the groundwork of the open process of the 
self-constitution of variation, with the variants actually appearing in intuition) is grounded as a higher level the true 
seeing of the universal as eidos” (EU, S. 413). This higher layer is the “active identification” in step three, and 
through this action, commonalities are eventually intuited as forms or essences.
 Thus, what kind of action is identification? Husserl states that “Where we speak of a true self (selbst) and of a 
presentation that is verified definitively, there we reach beyond the momentary consciousness through rememberings 
in which we repeatedly come back to the same presentation and to its same meant object; and in which, on the other 
hand, we can repeatedly secure for ourselves and potentially do secure for ourselves the verified self as an identical 
self, and one that is not capable of being crossed out” (HuaXI, S. 110). In addition, “Certainly, it originally 
constitutes a self [of the object], but a self that is identical and identifiable for the ego only by virtue of the manifold 
possible rememberings…” (HuaXI, S. 203). In other words, to obtain positive proof of identification, repeated 
recollection is necessary; or rather, as Shigeto Nuki states, “It is precisely because the action can be repeated that the 
object holds as an identity.” While making something quasi-present through repeated recollection is not itself based 
on grasping the implied past or on future intentionality, (it is precisely because of the reciprocal process of change at 
work in one’s grasp on the past and future intentionality that it becomes possible to speak of “repeating” in the first 
place) the claim that it is preconstituted by passive synthesis on a basic level is similar, but not the same (vgl. Hua 
XI). That aspect is changed every time one experiences something through the senses or in a way that affords 
mapping, so sensing cannot itself lead to identity. It is limited by the extent of the objects’ similarity or affinity. To 
actualize an object possessing an unshakeable identity, it is necessary to exceed the level of equivalence based on 
that experience (especially as a transcendental object). In other words, to actualize “objectivity” rather than a broad 
perceptual object such as an idea or a concept, the self must assume an object at that time as a preconstituted 
postulate and cut through higher-order thoughts such as proof or verification. In doing so, the commonalities that 
have surfaced through free variation can be intuitively grasped as an essence possessing “ideationally identical 
objectivity.”
 Accordingly, I have stated that it is not a perceptual object, nor is it a sensory experience. Just because one can 
intuit separate, individual reds, this does not mean that one intuits a universal red (vgl. EU. §88). As long as one goes 
through the action of free variation, one will soon come upon a general red with a different kind of objectivity to a 
sensory red, and the same applies to numbers. One can understand the act of counting individual perceptual objects 
and bringing them collectively toward numbers to occur based on this process of the intuition of essences.
 As explained above, the intuition of essences is established through several active operations taken as the basic 
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constitution of the consciousness, or prior passive synthesis. Experiential objects are freely varied through 
imaginative action and commonalities are highlighted through comparing and contrasting like with like; these are 
actively identified through repeated recollection. Based on this process of the intuition of essences through the 
process of conceptualization as free variation, one obtains that formal existence, and in recognizing numbers, intuits 
those numbers as conceptual objects (vgl. Hua IX, §9, c).
3. Conclusion
 As stated above, the conceptual existence of numbers may be constituted through the process toward the 
intuition of essences and the significant operations of time-consciousness and passive synthesis supporting that 
process. However, I have not examined here all of the points relating to natural numbers. As I described at the 
beginning of this paper, I have not considered how the numbers 1 and 0, which are prerequisites for mathematics, are 
constituted in the consciousness. I do plan to attempt to grasp how this first arises based on its relationship to 
completed and uncompleted intentionality and conduct a deeper study of genetic phenomenology as it relates to 
mathematics. However, once again, this will be a question to be addressed in another paper.
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experiential science are addressed in “Ideal models” (HuaXVIII, S. 258). The likely recognition of multiple experiential 
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essences.
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(1)” ‘Eko Firosofii’ kenkyuu 9, Touyou daigaku ‘eko firosofii’ gakusai kenkyuu inishiativu, 2015 (“A Thought Regarding the 
Beneficial Relationship between Phenomenology and Naturalism,” ‘Eco Philosophy’ Research. Published by Toyo University 
‘Eco Philosophy’ International Research Initiative, 2015, p. 244).
8 On this point, see Muto S. (b) (2015), pp. 243–244.
9 In Formale and transzendentale Logik, Husserl stated “It is vital to understand variation, not as an experiential variation but 
as arbitrary variation—‘purely’ of general things—accomplished in the pure consciousness, with pure freedom of 
imagination” (HuaXVII, S. 255).
10 On this point, see Chapters 1–3 of “Part 3: Combination” in The Analysis of Passive Synthesis. In the discussion on 
combination and detonation in passive synthesis, the operation of the conscious for comparison and contrast is analyzed. In 
particular, it sets the basic tone for how this paper considers the developmental constitutive process of the constitution of 
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